as the ones of the English mother land of the American colonies or the ancien regime. 4 It is not only since the second and third separation of Poland (1793/95) that the constitution was missing the notion of a nation in the sense of the political mobilised people. The 1791-text already does not establish a Polish law of citizenship. The principles of the equality of the citizens and the political equality as well as a proclamation of the fundamental rights were missing. Only the freedom of religion and of culture was mentioned in Art. 1 in the context of the fi xation of Roman Catholicism as the state religion. 5 The infl uence of the American constitutional movement on the Polish constitutional discussion during the Great or Four-Year Sejm (Sejm Wielki or Czte roletni) 1788-1792 documents the cultural coherence of the Polish 18 th century with the European Enlightenment 6 which is also refl ected by the Polish state of the art. 7 Furthermore, in the press of the Reichstag, the American role model underlines the Polish constitutional motive of documenting indepen dence from the insatiable neighbour and thereby leads to the thesis of the creation of a constitution as an act of the communication of governance. The latter is furthermore supported by the American struggle for freedom being used as a rhetorical arsenal of both the "patriotic" reform powers as well as the "old-Republican constitutional opponents" in the different press organs. This is proved by the indefi niteness of the constitutional terms of liberty and sove reignty as well as its openness for the elaboration of the political practice. The legal fi xation of the political order in a positive constitutional law is not static but translates the ways of thinking and perspectives in the sense of Burkhardt: rule only functions with the consent of the subject. The constitution becomes an "evolutionary achievement" 9 and is the result of the "interplay of the constitutional text, the social contest, the political practice and the constitutional interpretation". 10 The understanding of the creation of a constitution as an act of communicated governance captures the process-based nature of the constitutional ordering procedures of the creation and limitation of power. The institutional-historical constitutional historiography is thereby overcome. But it is not only the contemporary idea of law that is expressed by the political practice and the constitutional interpretation that contribute to an evolutionary constitutional understanding but also the mutual infl uence of the constitutional development in the different states.
11 Thus, the American Revolution may have had a great infl uence on the constitutional deliberations of the Great or Four-Year Sejm (Sejm Wielki or Czteroletni) of 1788-1792.
The following observations concerning the Polish May Constitution support such an evolutionary constitutional understanding as it was outlaid above:
1. In the tradition of the pre-revolutionary estates-based state, the Polish constitution of May 1791 just after its preamble formulates a constitutional contract between the estates' assembly representing the nation on the one side and "Stanisław August by the Grace of God through the will of the nation King of Poland" on the other. The constituent nation in the sense of the preamble is not meant to be understood as the sovereign people of free and equal citizens but -and this is in accordance with the old-estate understanding of the nobility as "the furthermost pillar of liberty and the contemporary constitution" -as the nation of the nobility. 13 The affi rmation of the old-Republican pacta conventa in Art. 7 perfectly fi ts into the picture. 14 2. Viewed from a different angle, the Polish May constitution is also very impressive for the procedural openness of the making of a constitution. This applies to the side by side of legal and parliamentary ministerial responsibility. As "father and head of the nation", the monarch is not responsible. The ministers appointed by the king assume legal responsibility for the decrees issued by the king by means of counter-signature. Moreover, in Art. 7, the May constitution fi xes a parliamentary vote of no confi dence which resembles the American impeachment requiring a two thirds majority: "In the case, by contrast, that both chambers united in the Reichstag demand the resignation of a minister from the state council or another position by means of a two thirds majority of secret votes, the King shall be held to most immediately appoint another to this position". 15 Elsewhere, I already fought against the tendency to view a contrast between constitutionalism and parliamentarism 16 which is especially popular within German science. 17 What is important is the correction that Art. 226 of the Spanish Cadiz-Constitution 1812 which insofar does not assume any special position. to as straż praw (guardian of the rights) in accordance to Montesquieu's dépôt des lois. The constitutional terminology of "the King in his state council" is proved by individual interpreters with the association of the English wording of "the king in council". 20 The state council which is subordinate to the laws and is to supervise the authorities consisted of the archbishop of Gnesen as primas of Poland, fi ve ministers 21 as well as two secretaries who had no right to vote and was furthermore headed by the King. The monarch is not responsible before the state council.
4. The elaboration of the two chamber legislative body which was separated from the executive 22 and made up of the Messengers' Chamber and the Senators' Chamber also shows potential for evolutionary development. While the Messengers' Chamber was supposed to be "the sanctuary of the legislature as the representative body and embodiment of national sovereignty", 23 the Senators' Chamber which was governed by magnates and headed by the King had a suspensive veto against the resolutions of the Messengers' Chamber. By contrast to the American constitution, the House of Representatives was dominating. If after the veto of the Senate, the same law was passed again by the House of Representatives, it was valid irrespective of the Senate's veto. The King possessed a single vote in the Senate; he did not have the right to veto by means of his chair. As was the case in the French September constitution, the King had a right of legislative initiative, the same applying to the messengers. Besides the 204 representatives of the nobility, 24 citizens were part of the Messengers' Chamber as commissioners of the royal cities. As representatives of the nation as a whole (Art. 6), the representatives from the (provincial) state parliaments were no longer dependent whereby the metamorphosis from an estate organ towards a modern representative institution can be observed. The estate-based perception of an imperative mandate turns into the conviction of the individual freedom of decision of the state citizen who is obliged to the general good. The majority principle was applied in both legislative bodies. Liberum veto and the confederate right were abolished. 21 Police/Interior affairs; exterior affairs; defense; justice; fi nances. 22 Art. 5 of the May constitution separates the executive power of the hereditary monarch and the one of the state council from the legislative power of the Reichstag as two chamber legislative body made up of the Messengers' Chamber and the Senators' Chamber and from the jurisdiction of the existing courts (cited in Willoweit, Seif, as annotation 1, p. 284). Compare Art. 7 and the explicit separation of the executive and legislative power: "The executive power shall not pass any laws, no taxes whatsoever, no state derivatives, not change the state income, not declare any war, no freedom, no contract and no diplomatic acts" (cited in Willoweit, Seif, p. 286). 23 Art. 6, cited in Willoweit, Seif (as annotation 1), p. 284. 24 Art. 6 at the end cited in Willoweit, Seif (as annotation 1), p. 286.
5.
It was not only in the case of the fi xation of parliamentary ministerial responsibility but also in the case of constitutional supremacy that the May constitution assumed a pioneering role. It is the only constitutional document of the revolutionary era that expressly articulates constitutional supremacy by stating that "all consecutive resolutions of the current sejm are to be consistent with the constitution in all respects" (ending of the introduction). The evolutionary character of such a declaration becomes even more evident when considering the importance of the constitutional body. Although the Polish May constitution does not systematically fi x the conditions of legitimacy after a revolutionary caesura as "the basis and foundation of government" in the wording of the Virginia Bill of Rights 1776 25 or as "le but de toute institution politique" in the wording of the declaration of human civil right as it is found in the September constitution 1791, 26 it fi xes a core part of normativity and a positive uniform constitutional text due to the notion of constitutional supremacy.
-And that, although the constitutional text of the American role model does not mention constitutional supremacy. 27 In the Federalist papers 28 which are widely read in Poland, constitutional supremacy is legitimised in Art. 85 25 Compare "le but de toute institution politique" in the diction of the preamble of the Declaration of human and civil rights 1789 (cited in Willoweit, Seif, as annotation 1, p. 250). Dippel's criticism is also not understandable concerning the suspensive veto of the American President according to Art. 1 Sec. VII (Willoweit, Seif, as annotation 1, pp. 261 et seq.). Since the presidential veto required a new discussion and adoption, the exercise of the veto has a suspensive effect (compare Schwartz, ibid., pp. 30,31; Cooke, ibid., pp. 52). Since the electoral college members in contrast to Art. 2 Sec. 1 (Willoweit, Seif, as annotation 1, pp. 267) proclaimed whom they were going to vote for as (vice) President, the people in fact elected their favourite candidate directly (Dumbauld, ibid., p. 264; Cooke, ibid., p. 78; Schwartz, ibid., p. by declaring it the last measurement for the acting of political powers. The constitution does not only defi ne a political order capable of assuring liberty and property but also the only system being able to assure the existence of the nation. By contrast to the English linguistic usage, during the American revolution, the terminological differentiation between the constitution and other law is developed, 29 the political revolution being understood as righteous breach of law. 30 Although the old constitutional semantics knew especially important and fundamental laws, 31 it did not inhibit the idea of a uniform law that was to be the measurement of the lawfulness of all other laws: "...in a Republic where the Law is superior to any or all the Individuals, and the Constitution superior even to the Legislature, and of which the Judges are the guardians and protectors." formulated James Iredell in his "Instructions to Chowan Coun ty Representatives" (1783). 32 Thanks to the new terminology, it is possible to declare certain acts "unconstitutional": "Therefore the terms constitutional and unconstitutional mean legal and illegal".
33 "Unconstitutional" was the taxation of the colonies by the London Parliament without the consent of the inhabitants (Sugar Act ["American Duties Act" 1764]; 34 Stamp Act ["Duties in American Colonies Act" 1765] 35 ), "constitutional", how ever, was the resistance of the colonies. 36 The broad effect of the adjective " unconstitutional" was based on the Americans endeavour -to be more loyal to the constitution than the English -to justify their resistance by reference to the British constitution and to legitimize the revolution as legal breach of the law. 37 This argumentation of the American revolutionaries was, from a Polish point of view, suitable to legitimize the resistance against the divine right of 29 G.S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, Chapel Hill N.C. 1969, p. 260. In 1789, France makes use of the English term "constitution" including all of its ambiguity and then even discusses the necessary amount of the separation of powers. 30 In America, the revolution is legally justifi ed with the medieval idea that the sovereignthe London parliament -may not commit any breaches of the law, otherwise a right of resistance of the people being triggered. This right of resistance of the people against parliament then had to be transformed into a legal order that excluded exactly that for future cases. 31 Concerning their supremacy by the "Council and the consent of the great" see Seif, 40 In the Sejm, two contrary political currents were represented: the conservative old-Republicans as guardians of the "golden liberty" in the sense of the Articuli Henriciani (1572) who were opposed to the Polish constitutional project on the one side and the reform party of the patriots on the other. None of the two had the majority in the Sejm and each was thus dependent on the support of the public which was courted by journalist reports.
II. Presentation of the American Revolution in the Polish
In their physiocratic liberal ideas and their Montesquieu understanding of the law, 41 the patriots sought the support of the Warsaw population by means of the press organs Gazeta Narodowa i Obca and Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny. 42 In the reports about the Sejm discussions about the rights of participation of the citizen population, the role model of the American society lacking estate differences, play an important role. For instance, the editor of the Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny Piotr Świtkowski discusses the rights of the townspeople in his article about the United States: it was a big mista- ke to assume that a great nation may be free if all political rights were only exercised by the nobility. In America, it was the personal accomplishment and not noble birth (paraphrased translation) 43 that counted. The anonymous pamphlet Dwóch nieboszczyków (Two dead men) of 1791 may be read in the same light. By reference to Willhelm Tell and George Washington, it denunciates the error that alone the noble ancestry and not intelligence, accomplishment, ability and virtue were to be hailed (paraphrased). 44 The same applies to the anonymous pamphlet Dusza Krajów, czyli o poddanych polskich (The sole of the country or about the Polish land people) of 1789: the youngest revolution in America, had awarded George Washington, a until then unknown inhabitant of Virginia, the name of a great general and founder of liberty and the whole world would remember his name with respect (para phrased). 45 Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz is even clearer: Nobody of us knows who the father of Washington or the grandfather of Franklin was. (…) But everybody knows and will remember in the future that Washington and Franklin freed America (paraphrased). 46 The leader of the patriotic reform movement, Hugo Kołłątaj (1750-1812), 47 who had great infl uence on the Sejmmar shall Stanisław Mała-chowski refers to the democratic ideas of Franklin and Wa shington 48 in order to justify his commitment for the political participation of the upper bourgeoisie that corresponds to his dedication for the representation of the cities in the Sejm and for the introduction of a modern economic system by creating a national bank.
In the journalistic debate about the economic consequences of the political rights of participation of the townspeople, America does not only serve as 43 The reference to America is omnipotent as the Journal Heb domadaire de la Diète which was published by Jan Potocki shows. 51 The American federal treaty of March 1, 1781 is printed often in the contemporary Polish press. 52 The constitutional draft of the Philadelphia Convention was published in the Gazeta Warszawska as well as in the Gazety Wileńskie. 53 Regular reports about the political system and the economic situation were published by Piotr Switkowski on a monthly basis in the Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny. 54 It was him who presented the principles of the new constitution and the governmental system of the United States of North America in the January edition of the Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny from 1790. 55 In the Gazeta Narodowa i Obca which is also pro-patriotic, the introductory speech of President Washington in the fi rst Congress is printed in two consecutive editions in January 1791 56 when the Polish constitutional draft was more and more opposed by the old-Republican opposition of conservative noblemen lead by Seweryn Rzewuski (1743-1811). The pro-patriotic Gazeta Narodowa i Obca prints Franklin's praise of the American constitution 57 in order to advertise for the Polish reform project. 58 Occasionally, the press reports about America are for-mulated as letters from America -with a clear tenor against the intrigues of the aristocratic opposition. For instance, a letter supposedly originating from Boston opposes the cabinet intrigues, the wars and disagreements in Europe to the wealth, calm and openness in the self-administered and independent United States of America in the Gazeta Narodowa i Obca of May 1791.
Stan prawdziwy wolnej Ameryki Północnej
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Piotr Świtkowski, too, promotes the acceptance of the Polish constitution with the successful history of America which only until shortly began its political existence under the fl ag of liberty (paraphrased) in the Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny (paraphrased). 60 In the same edition, Washington's report to the Congress is printed. 61 The Gazette de Varsovie follows this example. Especially during the constitutional deliberations about the Polish governmental system, the allusions to America serve the rhetorical ornamentation since to the general conviction, the American role model was not directly applicable to Poland. Not only the patriotic reform powers but also the old--Republican constitutional opponents make use of the American role model. ponds to American federalism if transferred to Polish circumstances. 65 A few anonymous authors supported Rzewuski's position of the elective kingdom as a guarantee for liberty by reference to the newly founded Republic of America. 66 Mazzei's correspondence with Stanislaw August II. proves how much the monarch and the reform party feared this old-Republican claim of a free peo ple not needing a king. 67 Philip Mazzei was Polish representative in Paris since 1788 and was admired by King Stanisław August II. Poniatowski (1764--1795) due to his friendship with Jefferson. 68 His correspondence which was published in the usual foreign languages is an important source for the Anglo-American role models of the reform positions of the royal court against the principle of unanimity in the Sejm and against the elective competence of the noble state parliaments for the Reichstag. They prove the royal reading and knowledge of the Two Treatises of Government of John Locke and the Federalist Papers. 69 Stanisław August was acquainted with the contemporary political institutions of England and America 70 and referred to the separation of powers as a "new theory of governance" 71 with which a strengthening of the executive branch with a hereditary monarch was perceived as compatible. 73 and the collection of the treaties between the European powers (Traktaty między mo carstwami europeyskiemi) of the historian Franciszek Siarczyński who therein consecrates a long introduction with a short summary of the American wars of liberation to the federal treaty. 74 In the last volume of the collection which was published in 1790, he published the constitution of the United States 1787. 75 The old-Republican praise for the American federalism is deciphered by Hugo Kołłątaj as a call for a "pure noble liberty which inevitably leads to the separation of the country" (paraphrased). 76 In his "Anonymous letters to Stanisław Małachowski" (1789) 77 and in "The political right of the Polish nation (1790)" 78 , Kołłątaj favoured a strict Republican constitution which due to the different geographic situation of Poland and America does not contradict a monarchical executive spearhead. Another mentor of the May constitution, Stanisław (Wawrzyniec) Staszic (1755-1826) 79 answers Rzewuski's polemics with the warning that the (noble) Republic cannot exist between despotic monarchies. 80 As philosopher and geologist, his interests are found in the scien-tifi c and economic development of the country whose economic misery he decried. 81 Ignacy Potocki (1751-1809), spokesman of the patriots in the Sejm, regrets that Poland cannot be a general republic or confederation according to the given circumstances but only a constitutional monarchy. 82 For the patriots, the hereditary monarch as the head of the executive power is owed to the neighbourhood to the separating powers. In the same direction goes a pamphlet Krótka rada względem napisania dobrej konstytucji (Short advice on how to elaborate a good constitution) which was published in 1790 in its paraphrased translation: "Even if a nation has no king, the legisla tive and executive power have to be separated. Then, the executive power is vested in the administration; the legislative power is vested in the national representatives. This is the situation in the thirteen American provinces… where each province has its own administration, its own courts, its own tax and military and all together have their House of Representatives with their President which only differs from the English King by his name [sic!] and enjoys the executive power and the might to make laws for the whole territory."
83 During the Polish reform discussion, the American role model strengthens the conviction that the executive power is best versted in a hereditary monarch.
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The United States, a confederation of colonies having gotten rid of George III. were eager to fi nd a surrogate for the king when modelling the presidential offi ce. In his series of essay in Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny, Świt-kowski compares the Polish and American constitutional circumstances and draws the reader's attention to the fact that the exterior political threat of Poland demands a strengthening of the executive as well as the introduction of a hereditary monarchy. 85 The prudence of the American constitutional deliberations 86 and of the constitutional text 87 as to the popular sovereign opens the possibility to both the reform powers as well as the reform opponents to refer to the American role model be it for the extension of political participatory rights to the townsmen or the restriction of the Crown by rights of resistance granted to the nobility. 88 In Art. I, sec. 8 of the American constitution of 1787, the classical rights of sovereignty are vested in the popular representation. 89 When in 1772 the Committee of Correspon dance of the city of Boston for the fi rst time formulates the thought of popular sovereignty, it seems rather owed to the necessity that there sould be limits for Westminster. It is only with the call for popular sovereignty that the parliamentary sovereignty 90 less than two years of enforcement. Against the "French pest at the Vistula", the Russian politic of hegemony initiated the confederation of Targowica, the acceptance of the latter by the crown with the accidence of King Stanisław Augusts in July 1792 marking the end of the Polish constitution. After the second separation in January 1793, the old-estate constitutional status before the May constitution is restored under the supervision of Russia with a reintroduction of the elective kingdom which meant the restoration of the status of guarantee and of the obligation of the Sejm to restore the cardinal rights of 1768. On November 25, 1795, Stanisław August resigned. The Polish May Constitution, formally recognized as the fi rst constitution in Europe, differed from the American Federal Constitution of 1787 and the French Constitution of 1791 in that that it had failed to create any legitimized foundations for a pro-revolutionary or modern state. Even worse, the Polish Constitution of 1791 did 101 not provide for Polish citizenship, nor did it directly articulate the principle of the equality of citizens or for political equality, or proclaimed the fundamental rights.
The manner in which American constitutionalism infl uenced the discussion going on during the Polish Great (4-year) Sejm 1788-1792 confi rms the cultural setting of the 18 th century Poland within the European Renaissance and refl ects, at the same time, certain specifi c features of the Polish state. The adopted American model was used for emphasizing Poland's will to remain independent of its predatory neighbours, while the events occurring during the revolution were used as a tool that served the patriotic, as well as the republican opposition, representatives. This could be best seen in the public media contemporary to the times, and it also explains the thesis that concepts such as freedom or sovereignty were not given and explicit defi nition, leaving, in consequence, an open space for their application to be used as deemed fi t in later practice. The anchoring of the political system in the positive constitutional law was not static, either. Instead, it meant upholding a view that principles operate only with the consent of the object. The constitution becomes an "evolutionary achievement" and remains a result of the "interaction of the constitutional text, the social context, and the political practice and constitutional interpretation". Such understanding of the drafting of a constitution as a communication of the system of government takes into account the whole evolutionary nature of constitutional procedures, which subsequently order the creation, and limit the authority, of the authorities. Constitutional historiography understood exclusively institutionally is currently passing away. Neither the contemporary conception of law, expressed by way of political practicing and constitutional interpretation, nor the wording of the constitutional preamble, has an impact on the comprehension of the evolutionary character of constitutionalism. Such an approach is favoured in the research project ReConFort fi nanced by the European Research Board, an essential element of which the Polish constitutional history is an element.
UNE NOUVELLE ANALYSE DE L'ÉLABORATION DE LA CONSTITUTION.
LA CONSTITUTION POLONAISE DU 3 MAI 1791 PERÇUE COMME CHEF-D'OEUVRE DE LA COMMUNICATION CONSTITUTIONNELLE R é s u m é La constitution de mai en Pologne, formellement considérée comme la première d'Europe, est différente de la constitution fédérale des États Unis de 1787. Elle diffè-re également de la constitution française de 1791 car la constitution polonaise ne crée pas de bases légitimes de l'indépendance de l'État post-révolutionnaire et moderne. Or, l'acte de 1791 n'a pas institué la nationalité polonaise. Ce qu'il lui manque, ce sont les règles d'égalité entre les citoyens, exprimées en direct, les règles d'égalité politique également ainsi que la proclamation des droits principaux. La façon dont le constitutionnalisme américain infl uence, en Pologne, les débats menés au sujet du régime institué au cours de la Diète de quatre ans (de 1788 à 1792) témoigne de l'ancrage culturel de la Pologne du XVIII e siècle dans le mouvement des Lumières européen. C'est aussi le refl et de la spécifi cité de l'État polonais. À l'époque de la Diète de quatre ans, dans le journalisme, le modèle américain est utilisé pour mettre en valeur les aspirations visant le maintien de l'indépendance par rapport aux États voisins expansionnistes. Les évènements de la révolution ont servi par ailleurs d'outils à l'arsenal rhétorique du camp patriotique mais aussi du camp des opposants républicains de la constitution, ce qui se manifeste dans les médias publics de la période. Cela justifi e la thèse portant la défi nition non aboutie des termes tels que: liberté, souveraineté, mais également le fait de s'ouvrir aux moyens permettant de les utiliser en pratique. L'ancrage du régime dans le droit constitutionnel positif n'est pas statique, il traduit la façon de penser et de percevoir les choses à l'époque : les règles ne peuvent fonctionner qu'avec l'accord du sujet. La constitution devient « une réussite de l'évolution » et demeure le résultat de « l'interaction du texte constitutionnel, du contexte social, de la pratique politique et de l'interprétation de la constitution ». Le fait de comprendre l'élaboration de la constitution comme une communication du système de gouvernance prend en compte la nature évolutive des procédures constitutionnelles qui mettent de l'ordre au niveau de la conception et limitation des pouvoirs. L'historiographie de la constitution entendue uniquement comme institutionnelle, disparaît. Le concept contemporain du droit, exprimé à travers la pratique politique et l'interpréta-tion constitutionnelle ainsi que la littérature comparée infl uencent la compréhension du caractère évolutif du constitutionnalisme. Cette approche est représentée dans le projet de recherche ReConFort, fi nancé par le Conseil européen de la recherche, dont l'élément essentiel est l'histoire constitutionnelle polonaise.
